Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2018

Presidents and War Powers
Matthew C. Waxman
Columbia Law School, mwaxma@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the President/
Executive Department Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew C. Waxman, Presidents and War Powers, LAWFARE (NOVEMBER 15, 2018) (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/2506

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

Presidents and War
Powers
M AT T H E W WA X M A N
Review of Michael Beschloss, “Presidents of War” (Crown Books, 2018)
The U.S. Constitution vests the president
with “executive power” and provides that
“The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy,” while it
endows Congress with the power “To
declare War.” These provisions have given
rise to two major questions about
presidential war powers: first, what should
be the president’s role in taking the country
to war, and, second, what are the
president’s powers to direct its conduct.

those stories to recent and ongoing
conflicts, including the war against alQaeda and its offshoots which is, after
seventeen years of conflict, America’s
longest running war.
The major argument of this book is that
“the notion of presidential war took hold
step by step.” (p. 585) By that Beschloss
means that presidents have gradually
assumed greater power over decisions to go
to war—contrary, in his view, to the
constitutional founders’ vision. That is a
very familiar story. Although the book does
succeed in offering some new insights into
how that accretion of power occurred, its
more original contribution lies in its
depictions of how presidents have handled
and managed the tasks of waging war.
Those responsibilities for the management
and supervision in the conduct of America’s
wars have grown more complex as warfare
has evolved—and they, too, look nothing
like what the founders expected or might
even have imagined.

Historian Michael Beschloss’s new book,
“Presidents of War,” examines how
presidents have responded to each of these
questions across two hundred years of U.S.
history. His account opens dramatically,
with President James Madison (something
of a tragic figure in the book’s telling)
fleeing as a fugitive while British forces
proceed to torch the White House in 1814.
Beschloss goes on to tell the stories of the
seven individuals who have presided over
America’s largest wars: James Madison
and the War of 1812, James Polk and the
Mexican-American War, William McKinley
and the Spanish-American War, Woodrow
Wilson and World War I, Franklin
Roosevelt and World War II, Harry
Truman and the Korean War and Lyndon
Johnson and the Vietnam War. The book
concludes with a brief epilogue relating

The book also puts an important focus on
the interrelationship between these two
types of presidential war powers. It
highlights
the
continually
shifting
relationship between war-initiation powers
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and war-waging powers throughout the
course of American history.

Beschloss shows throughout this account
that war presidents look to predecessors for
lessons—including mistakes to avoid. Most
of those lessons seemed to be practical ones
rather than reflections about constitutional
principle. An implication is that power and
constitutional law cannot be meaningfully
separated in this area.

Taking the Nation to War
That presidents have, since America’s
founding, asserted and exercised ever
wider authority to launch military
adventures is a well-known story. Scholars
are most likely to associate the general
thesis
with
Arthur
Schlesinger’s
monumental
book,
“The
Imperial
Presidency.” Beschloss, like Schlesinger,
sees this growth in presidential power as
gradual and starting very early in the
republic’s history. This is in contrast to
some modern scholars who pin it to the
onset of the Cold War and especially
Truman’s 1950 intervention in Korea
without
express
congressional
authorization. Beschloss, too, sees Korea as
a significant point in this trajectory, but
one that builds on steps taken by previous
war presidents like Madison and Polk.

Having framed the book in terms of the
Constitution,
however,
I
wondered
throughout my reading it just how
consciously, or conscientiously, these
presidents felt obliged to abide by either
the founders’ design or prior presidents’
interpretations of it. Or, for that matter,
how consciously they felt constrained by a
sense that they were establishing
constitutional justifications that would be
relied upon by their presidential
successors. Because Beschloss is so capable
of getting inside the minds of presidents, I
would have liked to hear more on this—if,
in fact, the war presidents struggled much
with these issues.

In telling the story of how each figure
became a war president, Beschloss avoids
sweeping theories. Indeed, the pictures he
paints are quite varied. Madison stumbles
reluctantly into war, whereas Polk actively
and deviously manipulates Congress and
the public into it. McKinley is reactive and
lacks a clear foreign policy strategy,
whereas Franklin Roosevelt adroitly and
incrementally moves the United States
into World War II, foreseeing grave
dangers that the public is not yet willing to
confront if he does not. Wilson, though he
had theorized as a scholar about the need
for presidents to assert broad foreign policy
power, showed little appetite to embroil the
United States militarily, whereas Truman
believed that freedom of military action
was important to containing the Soviet
bloc. Personal, political, bureaucratic and
geostrategic factors all play roles in the
stories of “presidential war.” This is a
phrase that then-Senator Daniel Webster
used to characterize the Mexican-American
War in 1846 and one that Beschloss adopts
to describe prevailing constitutional
practice.

Take, for example, Beschloss’s twist on the
usual story of Madison and the War of
1812. Most scholars of war powers,
including
Schlesinger,
characterize
Madison as pushed reluctantly into the war
by congressional “War Hawks” (thus
quickly turning on its head many founders’
supposition that presidents would incline
toward war while Congress would
generally incline against it). Although
Beschloss admires Madison as a hero of
constitutional drafting, he gives Madison
mixed grades in applying the Constitution
to war. He is especially tough on Madison’s
1812 move to solicit Congress’s declaration
that war existed with Great Britain.
Madison, Beschloss says, designed the
Constitution to avoid war except in cases of
absolute necessity and with broad public
support. By going to Congress for a war
declaration in 1812, however, he violated
both of those criteria: “By leading his
country into a major war that had no
absolute necessity or overwhelming
support from Congress and the public,
Madison, of all people, had opened the door
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for later Presidents to seek involvement in
future conflicts that suffered from such
shortcomings.” (p. 5)

probably had more to do, it seems to me,
with expanding national power and
broader changes in American foreign policy
than with interpretation of constitutional
dictates or ethics, including those arising
from the supposed weight of precedents.

Later in the book, Beschloss reiterates this
point, with a distinct emphasis on how
actions of a president in a given would
almost inevitably create precedents for
future presidents and, importantly, thus
create
over
time
institutional
interpretations of the Constitution:

The two presidents who Beschloss
describes as thinking most consciously
about the precedents they were setting for
successors are Lincoln and Truman. Yet
there is more than a bit of irony in both
cases. Lincoln, knowing that the Civil War
was a unique threat to the Republic,
wanted to avoid setting precedent—and,
yet, the wartime moves he made have been
cited often since then to support
presidential war powers. Truman may
have been the one most attentive to
precedent he was setting—but the
precedent he wanted to set ran counter the
founders’ vision. Beschloss describes how
Truman calculatingly preferred not to get
congressional authorization for the Korean
War, in part because he believed that the
Cold War required less-encumbered
presidential agility to use military force.
He also describes how Truman, more than
other presidents, consulted history to guide
him in tough decisions. A predecessor he
admired for his presidential initiative was
none other than Polk, who stands out as
the greatest anti-hero of the book. Truman
regarded constitutional architect Madison
as weak and indecisive. But he admired
Polk because, in his words, he “regularly
told Congress to go to hell on foreign policy
matters.” (p. 462)

As one of the chief architects of the
American system, Madison knew that
the nature of the first major war to be
fought under any President would do
much to shape how often and how lightly
the nation went to war in the future—
and that engaging in this conflict would
mean relaxing the established standard
in Philadelphia. (p. 60)
But we might pause and ask: did Madison
view it this way, and how exactly did
Madison’s actions make it easier for future
presidents to lead the country into war?
Madison eases his own conscience about
presidential war by asking Congress to
declare that a state of war already
existed—rather than urging Congress to
declare war. Apparently even he—the
great
constitutionalist
Madison—was
willing
to
sidestep
constitutional
formalities for war when he deemed it
expedient.
Beschloss’s
assessment
additionally seems to imply that had
Madison resisted the war hawks, the
founders’ original vision might have held
up better. I question this, though, after
reading the book’s later chapters. I doubt,
for example, that Polk would have behaved
any differently in provoking war with
Mexico in 1846, or that McKinley would not
still have succumbed to war frenzy against
Spain in 1898. It is undoubtedly true that
presidents have, over time, engaged in
wars for reasons that many founders would
have opposed—reasons well short of
absolute
necessity.
But
changing
thresholds and justifications for war over
the very long run of American history

The book’s war presidents agonized about
a lot of things in going to war.
Constitutional law does not seem to have
been one of them.
Directing War
Beschloss laments that the “Founders
would probably be thunderstruck” to
discover modern presidents’ power to
initiate major military conflicts (p. 586). I
think they would also be thunderstruck to
discover how much power presidents have
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wielded in waging war, including vast
authority delegated by Congress pursuant
to its own expansive war powers. Lincoln
wielded wartime powers over the economy,
slaves, conscripts and dissenters that
would have shocked most founders. Wilson
took those types of powers to a new level,
and then Roosevelt did so to a greater level
still. Although Madison and many founders
feared standing armies, Truman built a
“permanent war machine.” (p. 434)

middle of the book: McKinley was caught
off guard by the challenges of managing a
global empire after deciding to keep the
Philippines; Wilson had grand visions for a
new international order but failed
miserably to build domestic support for it
at home; and Franklin Roosevelt laid the
military,
diplomatic
and
political
groundwork for a postwar order (although
that architecture would need to be adapted
to the Cold War). As important as they
became, these imperative post-conflict
aspects of waging war were probably far
from the minds of most constitutional
founders.

This book does a lot to show the many
essential elements of the president’s
commander-in-chief function. We know
generally what the founders did not want
presidents to do in war—which was to seize
tyrannical power. We know relatively little
about what they wanted presidents to do in
conducting war, though.

Among the other lessons Beschloss draws
is that the best wartime presidents are able
to explain effectively war stakes and
strategy to the public as well as to match
war aims with higher moral imperatives.
Here again he points to Lincoln and
Roosevelt as models, especially compared
to their prior war presidents, Polk and
Wilson, respectively. Note, however, that if
Beschloss is correct that the founders
expected war to be waged only in cases of
immediate and grave national danger and
only with overwhelming public support,
once again, these considerations would not
have seemed to them likely priorities for
war presidents.

One virtue that Beschloss emphasizes is
some presidents’ ability to maintain control
over war strategy, sometimes even against
the strong recommendation of military
leaders. The chapters on Lincoln stress
how that president learned to balance and
coordinate Civil War military strategy with
political
strategy.
Beschloss
gives
significant treatment to Truman’s sacking
of General Douglas MacArthur during the
Korean War, after the president lost faith
in the general’s willingness to follow
civilian strategic guidance. And one of the
most remarkable, if brief, moments is when
President Johnson rejects General William
Westmoreland’s planning for possible use
of tactical nuclear weapons in Vietnam.
These episodes call to mind Eliot Cohen’s
terrific book on civil-military relations,
“Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen,
and Leadership in Wartime,” which argues
that the greatest wartime statesmen
actively question and even sometimes defy
military advice.

Interlocking War Powers
As these last points suggest, by discussing
together both how presidents have taken
the nation to war and how they have
managed it, Beschloss underscores the
ever-shifting relationship between those
powers, and how generally the founders
intended, or failed to consider adequately,
how various constitutional war powers
would fit together.
For example, Beschloss emphasizes that a
major worry of the constitutional founders
was that fame, glory and aggrandizement
of power in directing wars might tempt
presidents, like “the European despots they
abhorred,” to launch them. (p. 586) In other
words, power in war would affect

Another aspect of waging war in which
presidential leadership over time became
especially crucial is preparing for and
managing the peace that follows. Beschloss
astutely highlights this function with the
sharply contrasting stories around the
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proneness to war. This was a weighty
argument in lodging the power to declare
war—or most would say, more broadly, to
initiate war—in Congress. There is some
intuitive logic here, although I think many
founders under-estimated the problem that
wars can result from too little military
power or willingness to use it, not just from
too much.

president while serving longer than many
founders likely would have approved.
Finally, although “Presidents of War”
argues
that
many
constitutional
constraints devised to avoid war have been
gutted over the course of American history,
the war presidents it depicts are rarely
war-mongers like those the founders most
feared. With the exception of Polk, none of
the featured presidents sought war. Some
came out publicly glorified, but all the war
presidents of this book were tormented and
damaged physically and mentally by the
pressures of war. They were almost all
reluctant commanders-in-chief.

Moreover, this arrangement raises another
constitutional design question: if the
Constitution was designed to ensure that
wars would be rare, was it also designed to
ensure
that
the
president
would
nevertheless be an effective wartime leader
in those rare instances? The founders seem
to have given relatively little thought to
that latter question, perhaps because they
expected the first president to be George
Washington—by far the best wartime
leader available. And they did not expect it
to matter very much so long as they got the
former issue right (that is, by designing the
Constitution to help keep the United States
out of wars to begin with).

Does that mean that the constitutional
design has somehow succeeded—whether
because of or despite accumulating war
powers in the presidency? My own
intuition—one reinforced by this book—is
that the American Constitution generally
deserves much credit for the nation’s
security and prosperity over time, but that
the declare war clause and formal powers
to initiate war have always been less
important to that story than other still
more basic constitutional features.

But the United States has engaged in many
wars, and Beschloss’s book is a reminder
that in the most important wars of
survival—the Civil War and World War
II—the United States had its most superb
wartime leaders in Lincoln and Roosevelt.
Was that just luck? It is hard for me to give
much credit to constitutional design for
this, especially given that in neither case
was each elected by a public interested in
war, Lincoln was a dark horse candidate
altogether, and Roosevelt became a war
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